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Asymmetrical bargaining in the
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P. Terrence Hopmann
Bargaining relationships in formal international conferences and negotiations may involve
structural asymmetries. A comprehensive analysis of these asymmetries in bargaining may be
found in a synthesis of literature from formal game theory, structural-manipulative ap-
proaches to bargaining, social psychology, and the study of political influence. Propositions
based on this literature focus on two factors which are likely to contribute to asymmetrical
outcomes in negotiations: unequal costs to the negotiators from the failure to agree, and
unequal resources available to employ in bargaining or influence attempts. An analysis of
bargaining in the section of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)
dealing with the issues of European security gave qualified support to these propositions.
Influence over the final text in the CSCE agreement is related to a rough index of losses which
would have resulted for individual nations from the failure to reach agreement in the CSCE. In
addition, influence over the final text is related to each nation's resources, especially military
resources. More significantly, the two superpowers exerted considerable asymmetrical influ-
ence over what was not included in the CSCE agreement, thus exercising a substantial veto.
Thus, the asymmetrical outcomes within the CSCE negotiations were reflective of both
differences in "threat potential," that is, in the losses which actors would receive if no
agreement had ensued, as well as differences in resources.
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142 International Organization
I Introduction
Asymmetries in international relations may be manifested in many different ways.
This paper will focus upon some of the asymmetries which may appear in the course
of bargaining among nations in a relatively formal conference setting. Although the
process of international negotiation has received increased attention in the literature
of international relations in recent years, relatively little of that attention has been
directed towards the issue of inequality and asymmetry within the bargaining pro-
cess. Therefore, one must look largely outside the field of international relations in
search of heuristic propositions which might guide research in this area. This paper
will review a wide range of literature, including formal game theory and theories of
strategy and bargaining, in the search for propositions that might help to explain the
conditions under which negotiations will produce asymmetrical outcomes.
Propositions which are developed in this fashion may be of value in guiding
research, although they are unlikely to produce any definitive answers to questions
about the bargaining process. The validity of these propositions may be evaluated
according to two principal standards. The first standard is a logical one: whether or
not the propositions can be justified on the basis of consistency with some funda-
mental assumptions and rules of interrelatedness. This paper will attempt to synthe-
size a model of the bargaining process with special reference to the issue of asym-
metrical outcomes. The primary purpose of this will not be to derive nonobvious
propositions from a formal theory, although this approach may fortuitously produce
such results on occasion. Rather the principal objective here will be simply to
evaluate the logical foundations of some basic propositions about asymmetries in
the bargaining process, applying the test of logical consistency. Of course, propo-
sitions may be logically consistent but still not valid for describing or explaining a
process occurring in international relations. Therefore, the second test for the valid-
ity of the propositions is an empirical one; whether or not the propositions are
consistent with observed data. Therefore, the paper will explore the empirical
plausibility of the propositions developed here through a case study consisting of an
analysis of that portion of the negotiations in the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) which dealt with the issues of security and with
"confidence building measures."
There has been considerable attention in recent international relations research
to the issue of international negotiations, with the most important work probably
being that of Ikle1 and Lall.2 Most of these approaches to negotiations have focused
on a set of interdependent actors engaged in bargaining, although surprisingly little
attention has been devoted to the "asymmetrical interdependencies" which may
'Fred Charles Ikle, How Nations Negotiate (New York: Praeger, 1964).
2Arthur Lall, Modern International Negotiations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966).
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Asymmetrical bargaining in the CSCE 143
exist among the participants.3 Most attention has been devoted to studies of
Soviet-American negotiations on issues such as the Partial Test Ban Treaty and the
Strategic Arms Limitations Talks, where such asymmetries have largely not been
present. Much of the literature has overlooked the fact that power resources and
control relations among the actors engaging in many international negotiations are
not even approximately equal. This applies within the major power alliances, where
the superpowers and the smaller bloc members certainly do not have equal bases to
provide resources to "affect other actors" directly, to deprive them of "desired
exchange goods," or prevent one another from "achieving domestic goals."4 This
also applies to the relations between nonaligned actors, especially the less de-
veloped countries of the world on the one hand, and members of the two superpower
blocs, on the other.
Power discrepancies have not been totally overlooked in recent writing on
negotiations. For example, Lall has suggested the following proposition about the
relationship between power asymmetry and the negotiation process:
When there is a real or assumed significant disparity of power between the
parties to a dispute or situation, or when one of the parties is imbued with a
sense of growing power, then such disparity or sense of buoyant power may
militate against resort to negotiation to settle the dispute or ameliorate the
situation.5
While Lall emphasizes power considerations with regard to the issue of entry
into negotiations and concerning a country's general stance towards negotiations,
when he turns to the subject of concessions and movements towards agreement he
tends to deal almost exclusively with considerations of bargaining strategy. The
structural asymmetries among the actors are not introduced as a significant consid-
eration affecting the process and outcome of negotiations. Thus a central objective
of this paper is to extend theories of negotiation to include assumptions about the
effects of structural asymmetry upon the bargaining process. An adequate theory of
bargaining at the international level must include such a component in order to
describe and explain how negotiations operate in the realm of international rela-
tions.
The concept of asymmetry as it is treated in bargaining theory is similar to
theories of power, influence, or relational control as exhibited in other work in
international relations, although the emphasis is sometimes different. One major
difference in emphasis is that theories of bargaining assume that actors seek an end
goal of agreement and that they hope to collaborate in some way to receive mutually
beneficial outcomes which they cannot achieve unilaterally. As Ikle observes,
3Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "World Politics and the International Economic System," in
C. Fred Bergsten, ed., The Future of the International Economic Order: An Agenda for Research
(Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1973).
4James A. Caporaso, "Relational Control and Power in the Global System: A Structural and Behavioral
Analysis" (Evanston: Northwestern University, mimeo, 1975).
5Lall, p. 150.
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144 International Organization
"Two elements must normally be present for negotiations to take place: there
must be both common interests and issues of conflict."6 If there were no
common interests, then there would be no basis for negotiations; in this
case a theory of coercion would perhaps be more applicable. On the other
hand, if there were no conflicting interests, then there would be nothing to
negotiate about as the actors' positions might be expected to converge naturally. In
short, bargaining theory deals with "mixed motive" situations in which the indi-
vidual interests of actors are partially but not completely overlapping. By contrast,
theories of dependence as relational control may deal only with unilateral relation-
ships in which one actor may require another with completely different interests to
act in a manner preferred by the former. Although most bargaining relationships are
multidirectional and are based in part on common interests, concepts of influence
and relational control are still relevant in many instances. The fact that two or more
actors have some interests in common does not mean that they are in the same
structural position to influence the negotiated outcomes; nor does it mean that a
resulting agreement will benefit all actors equally. In order for an agreement to
occur, all actors must perceive that they will receive a better net outcome with the
agreement than they would without it. However, the overall gains may not necessar-
ily be distributed evenly among the actors, and this unevenness in outcomes may be
the result of structural or relational asymmetries among the actors. It is at this point
that these two approaches meet and need to be integrated more fully.
/ / Structural asymmetry in a theory of bargaining
In this section I shall begin to develop a framework to analyze the effects of
structural asymmetry in bargaining situations. The sections will draw heavily upon
the literature of formal game theory, social psychology, and political models deal-
ing with power and influence relations to identify some tentative propositions about
how structural asymmetry will affect bargaining. This review will be based largely
upon theoretical developments in past work on bargaining, but it will attempt to
sharpen and extend those aspects which deal most extensively with asymmetry. In
this effort, I will be operating primarily at the level of "the state as actor," based
upon the assumption that negotiators at international conferences serve as represen-
tatives of their states and are the articulators of policy outcomes developed within
the decision-making apparatus of the state. However, in order to evaluate the effect
of structural factors on bargaining, it will also be necessary to look at the systemic
context within which most negotiations occur.
6Ikle, p. 2.
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Asymmetrical bargaining in the CSCE 145
The game theoretic orientation
One of the most prominent sources of models about the negotiation process is
mathematical game theory. There are, of course, some serious limitations to the
application of game theoretic models to the analysis of international negotiations.
For example, game theoretic models assume that the number of players in a game is
fixed and known, that each player acts rationally in the sense of trying to maximize
his own personal gains, that payoff functions are fixed and known in advance by the
players, and that communications between the players cannot affect the form or
content of the game.7 Many of these assumptions are not met in international
negotiations, especially the assumptions about communications and about perfect
information concerning payoff functions. Furthermore, game theoretic models alone
tend to be static, dealing largely with the relationship between initial conditions
(actors' preferences) and outcomes (the distribution of some value). Little direct
attention is paid to the dynamic process of negotiation. In spite of these very serious
limitations, game theoretic models may help to clarify the structure of negotiation
situations. They may also provide a foundation for building more complex and
dynamic models of bargaining through the introduction of elements not included in
formal game theoretic models.
The bargaining game
Most game theoretic models of bargaining are classified as two-person, non-
zero-sum games. Bargaining necessarily involves a theory of non-zero-sum games,
since as noted previously negotiations occur only in "mixed motive" situations in
which elements of cooperation and conflict are present simultaneously. Since this
paper deals with a multilateral conference, an n-person theory would appear to be
more appropriate than a two-person theory. However, the treatment of the bargain-
ing problem is currently far better developed in the two-person case and is thus
heuristically more interesting. Therefore, I shall begin with a two-person model and
then suggest some of the implications of expanding it to deal with the n-person case
later in this section.
A classic two-person, non-zero-sum representation of the bargaining situation
is depicted in matrix form in Figure 1. This game is generally referred to as the
"Battle of the Sexes."8 Unlike some games, this particular one does not have a
single solution which would always be obtained in one play of the game. Rather,
any long-term solution of this game must be determined through the "mixed
strategies" which players would employ if they were to play this game many times.
A schematic representation of this matrix is presented in Figure 2, assuming that the
7Oran R. Young, Bargaining: Formal Theories of Negotiation (Urbana, 111.: University of Illinois
Press, 1975), p. 23.
8An excellent exposition of the "Battle of the Sexes" as a basis for the game theoretic treatment of the
negotiated game may be found in Anatol Rapoport, Two Person Game Theory (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1969).
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146 International Organization
Figure 1. The "Battle of the Sexes": Utility Matrix
Player Two
Player One
A
A 1,0
B -c,-d
B
-a,-b
0,1
Figure 2. The "Battle of the Sexes": Payoff Polygon
Player One's Payoffs
L ( 1 , 0 )
(-c-d)
(0,1)
Player Two's
Payoffs
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Asymmetrical bargaining in the CSCE 147
values of a, b, c, and d are all greater than zero and less than one and that the
minimum values of a and b are greater than the maximum values of c and d. The
polygon which connects the four possible outcomes on any one play of the game
contains all possible combinations of payoffs for both players. The players could
employ any combinations of mixed strategies, always producing long-term so-
lutions somewhere inside this polygon. However, the players will not be maximiz-
ing their own utilities unless they reach an agreement within this polygon
along the line connecting (1,0) and (0,1). Along this line one player can do
better only at the expense of the other player, so this line is referred to as the
negotiation set. It is along this line that tradeoffs must be made between the prefer-
ences of the two players. Thus the first assumption of the bargaining game is that
agreement should be reached along a line where both of the players are no longer
able to improve their payoffs jointly. The effort to reach this point in the game is
essentially cooperative. However, the struggle to achieve a final solution at some
point along this line tends to be largely conflictual, since movement in either
direction will benefit one player at the other's expense.
In order to determine the range of acceptable agreements along the negotiation
set, one must also calculate each player's minimum payoff, that is, the outcome
which he can assure himself by playing alone without regard for the play of the
other. This outcome is calculated by each player as if he were playing a zero-sum
game and selecting his minimax strategy. No matter what the other player does, one
cannot be forced into a worse outcome than that based on the minimax strategy.
This minimum payoff which each actor can assure himself is known as his security
level. In some instances the security levels of the players fall outside the negotiation
set, in which case they in no way constrain the outcomes reached. In other cases
they may serve to restrict the negotiation set as diagrammed in Figure 3. Since a
player will not settle for a negotiated settlement below his security level, when these
bounds do cross the negotiation set they will reduce the range of viable agreements
along that set. Thus, the second essential assumption of the bargaining game is that
agreement will fall on the negotiation set within the range circumscribed by the
security levels of the two players, as no player will accept a negotiated settlement
that would leave him worse off than he would be by acting alone.
Thus far the model of the negotiated game leaves undetermined the precise
point at which an agreement will occur, and the procedure for determining this point
has been the subject of some dispute among game theorists who are not in funda-
mental accord about what additional assumptions should be made. Yet the determi-
nation of this point is important if one wants to determine whether outcomes will be
relatively equally divided between the two actors or if they will tend to favor one
rather than another. Perhaps the most basic solution has been proposed by Nash,
who suggests three assumptions in addition to those already stated:9
"John F. Nash, "Two Person Cooperative Games," reprinted in Young, pp. 69-71.
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148 International Organization
Figure 3. The Restricted Negotiation Set
A's Security Level
Restricted Negotiation Set
B
B's Security Level
(1) The transformation invariance axiom: linear transformations of the payoffs
do not change the relative position of the players with regard to the solution.
(2) The symmetry axiom: the solution does not depend on how the players are
labeled.
(3) The independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom: the solution is indepen-
dent of irrelevant alternatives such as would occur if additional payoff pairs became
available without changing the status quo point.
Nash then demonstrates that there is one unique solution which will maximize
the product of the differences between the values of the game for both players and
the values of the status quo point, in this case the values which the players would
receive if they didn't play the game at all. In the case of the matrix depicted in
Figures 1 and 2, the only payoffs considered in calculating the solution would be
(1,0) and (0,1), and the solution would be for each player to get his preference 50
percent of the time. Over a series of plays the average payoff would be .5 for each
player. This solution thus produces an outcome which approximates a common
sense notion of "equity" or "splitting the difference." This solution applies, how-
ever, only when the status quo point is fixed and the game is symmetrical.
Other proposed solutions take account of the other values in the payoff matrix,
and they treat the status quo points as variable. Thus, if the non-cooperative out-
comes produced costs for the two parties which were not equal, then the status quo
point would be located at a point which would produce asymmetrical outcomes for
the players. There have been a number of major efforts to establish variable status
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Asymmetrical bargaining in the CSCE 149
quo points.10 One, introduced by Shapley, requires player A to threaten to play^'s
own minimax strategy, thereby leaving B worse off than he would be \iA pursued a
cooperative strategy.11 A second, suggested by Nash, requires player ,4 to threaten
to leave player B atfl's security level.12 In Shapley's solution, A threatens to seek
A's own security level, which may or may not leaveB at his security level, depend-
ing on the structure of the payoff matrix; however, this is certain to leave B worse
off than if they had reached a cooperative outcome. In Nash's solution, A threatens
to force B to fi's security level.
The calculation of these two outcomes is somewhat more complex than for
Nash's simple solution. Shapley's solution requires that one take into account the
values of a, b, c, and d from Figure 1. From this a status quo point is located as the
intersection of the security levels of the two players. In the determination of this
status quo point, then, the losses of the players from noncooperative outcomes are
taken into account and affect the outcome. If there are no differences between the
losses of the two players (i.e., \ia=b and c=d); then the solution reduces to Nash's
simple one. On the other hand, if A's losses from the failure to agree are greater than
fi's (i.e., if a>b andc>d), then B's preferences will tend to be favored more often.
In short, the player who stands to lose the most from the failure to agree will get a
smaller proportion of the outcome. An inequality in losses from noncooperation can
produce asymmetric outcomes even in the case where the actual agreement is
obtained along the negotiation set. This is because the player who can threaten the
other with a noncooperative result with the least cost to himself is in a better position
to demand a greater share of the gain from a cooperative outcome. Shapley refers to
this form of influence as "threat potential." The less the costs of noncooperation,
the greater the potential to threaten the other party with noncooperative outcomes in
an effort to extract a greater share of any potential gains. Nash's extended solution is
similar to Shapley's, except that it focuses on what player A can threaten to do to B
by leaving B at his security level. It thus deals with the costs to the player if the other
player chooses to punish him for failing to agree to terms favored by the first. In this
case the player who would suffer the greater punishment if left at his security level
has less threat potential and therefore less capability to influence the outcome of an
agreement.
In short, these game theoretic models suggest that asymmetrical outcomes in
negotiation will be affected by the relative threat potential of negotiators, in the
following ways: (1) those actors with the least cost from noncooperative outcomes
will have the greatest threat potential and are thus likely to obtain a proportionately
larger share of the outcome of an agreement, whereas those actors with the greatest
'"Several possible solutions not discussed here have been proposed by Howard Raiffa, "Arbitration
Schemes for Generalized Two-Person Games," in H. W. Kuhn and A. W. Tucker, eds., Contributions
to the Theory of Games, II (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1953), and R. B. Braithewaite,
Theory of Games as a Tool for the Moral Philosopher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955).
"L.S. Shapley, "A Value for N-Person Games," in H.W. Kuhn and A.W. Tucker, eds., op. cit.
12John F. Nash, "Noncooperative Games," Annals of Mathematics, Vol. 54: 155-62.
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750 International Organization
costs from noncooperative outcomes will have the least threat potential and are thus
likely to obtain a proportionately smaller share of the outcome of an agreement; (2)
those actors who will suffer the greatest loss from being left at their security levels
will have the least threat potential and are thus likely to obtain a proportionately
smaller share of the outcome of an agreement, whereas those actors who will suffer
least from being left at their security level will have the greatest threat potential and
thus are likely to obtain a larger share of the outcome of an agreement.
Thus outcomes along the negotiation set are influenced by the location of the
status quo point. In proposition (1) the status quo point is determined by the
intersection of the security levels of the two players. In proposition (2) it is the threat
by one player to reduce the status quo point of the other to the other's security level
which affects the outcome. Both propositions explain asymmetrical outcomes lar-
gely as a function of the costs to the actors of noncooperative solutions, and both
tend to suggest that the player with greater costs from the failure to cooperate will
receive less in any solution, including a cooperative one along the negotiation set.
The two-person model of bargaining has been extended into n-person game
theory by Harsanyi.13 In this instance, instead of considering the bargaining posi-
tions of individual actors, the model looks at all possible subsets of players, called
syndicates, which might potentially form coalitions. When the two maximal coali-
tions are found, the bargaining between them reduces essentially to that predicted by
the model from two-person game theory. In the case of international negotiations,
however, actors do not enter into coalitions on the basis of purely utilitarian consid-
erations. Rather, in most instances, coalitions are preformed and are fairly stable, so
that aspects of n-person game theory dealing with coalition formation are likely to
be of relatively little interest in the case of many formal conferences (although they
might be of some interest for institutions like the UN General Assembly). Without
making assumptions about coalition formation, however, n-person game theory
does not produce any determinate results and is thus of little heuristic value in
comparison with the two-person version. Therefore, although it requires considera-
ble simplification, interactions in this paper will be treated largely in terms of
two-person bargaining between opposing coalitions or alliances or in terms of a
series of bargaining dyads connecting independent actors without regard for other
actors with whom they may be interacting simultaneously.14
An application of the asymmetrical bargaining game to international negotiations
I shall next attempt to extend the conceptualization based on formal game
theory into a general bargaining model which will focus on some of the behavioral
13John C. Harsanyi, "A Bargaining Model for the Cooperative N-Person Game," in R.D. Luce and
A.W. Tucker, eds., Contributions to the Theory of Games, IV (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1959).
14For an extensive treatment of n-person game theory and of its limitations for the purposes of the
present analysis see Anatol Rapoport, N-Person Game Theory (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 1970).
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implications of the more formal theory. Such a model may then be modified to
introduce dynamic elements, including strategic and psychological considerations,
which are not treated adequately in the basic model.
One implication of the formal bargaining game is that negotiations are likely to
be composed of two logically separate, though not necessarily temporally separate,
phases. The first phase entails the effort to seek agreements which fall within the
negotiation set. In Figure 2 any solution to the lower left of the line connecting
payoffs (1,0) and (0,1) would be contrary to the interests of both parties. Thus any
potential solutions falling anywhere within the negotiation polygon other than on the
negotiation set, that is, the northeast boundary of the polygon, are not optimal in the
sense that each party can improve its position without necessarily hurting the other.
In other words, mutually beneficial moves are possible anywhere within the poly-
gon except on the northeast boundary. In an important work on labor negotiations,
Walton and McKersie describe this aspect of negotiations as "integrative" bargain-
ing. They define integrative bargaining as a "system of activities which is instru-
mental to the attainment of objectives which are not in fundamental conflict with
those of the other party and which therefore can be integrated to some degree."15
The process of integrative bargaining is characterized by "problem-solving," in
which the negotiators, seek to identify common interests. Thus, this phase of bar-
gaining essentially entails cooperation between actors. A negotiation polygon which
should produce a purely integrative solution to the bargaining problem is depicted in
Figure 4. In this case any solution other than at point p is not in the interest of either
party. Thus once the two parties have identified between themselves the existence of
this point, they should be able to agree upon it at once. Although there may be
structural asymmetries that produce a situation like that depicted in Figure 4, there
should be no asymmetry in incentive to influence or force the other to move from
point p.
The second phase of the negotiation process, at least in a situation like that
depicted in Figure 2, is a conflictual one, which Walton and McKersie characterize
as requiring a "distributive" bargaining process. They refer to this as "the complex
system of activities instrumental to the attainment of one party's goals when they are
in basic conflict with those of the other party."16 It is this aspect of bargaining
which has attracted the greatest attention of game theorists, because it is here that
the question of distributing the gains of an agreement arises. In the case of the
matrix in Figure 2, the players must decide on a mixed strategy to determine what
proportion of the time player/1 wins the utility of 1 relative to the proportion when B
wins. It is here that their interests diverge, since each would prefer to win almost
always and receive an average payoff for himself as close to 1 as possible, leaving
the other with an average payoff as close to 0 as possible. It is in this phase that the
asymmetrical capability to threaten enters in to the determination of this distribu-
tion.
"Richard E. Walton and Robert B. McKersie, A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1965), p. 5.
l6Ibid., p. 4.
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Figure 4. A Purely Cooperative Game
Figure 5. A Mixed Motive Game
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As Walton and McKersie point out, however, a purely game theoretical solu-
tion does not take into account some of the behavioral phenomena which tend to
appear when individuals are forced to play games with both integrative and distribu-
tive characteristics. For example, a polygon such as that depicted in Figure 5 would
lead, according to Nash's procedure, to an agreement at point p. However, the
solution at this point is not stable, unlike at pointp in Figure 4, because each party
still has an incentive to move away from it in a direction designed to secure for
himself unilateral gains at the expense of the other. Indeed, in this case the party not
moving would suffer greater losses than the other gained. Such a move, of course,
violates the assumptions of Nash's theory which seeks to maximize joint payoffs
and arrive at some "fair" distribution reflecting the different utility schedules of the
actors. But if one actor desires more than his "fair" share, there is nothing in the
logic of the game to prevent him from seeking such gain.
The arguments made thus far may be summarized by reference to a simple
bargaining model, diagrammed in Figure 6. This model depicts on a horizontal axis
an issue dimension along which both parties are assumed to have conflicting prefer-
ences. In this diagram A prefers outcomes towards the left, as close as possible to
point a', whereas B prefers outcomes towards the right as close to b' as possible.
Lines A- - -A' and B- - -B' represent a utility curve in which gains and losses are
standardized with reference to some status quo point such as the value of no
agreement. Thus at any point along the issue dimension the expected gains and
losses which each actor would receive relative to the neutral outcome of the con-
tinuation of the status quo may be located. By using a common status quo point for
both players such as the value of no agreement, the preferences of the two parties
may be compared with one another. This does not necessarily imply that the actors
feel indifferent about the status quo in some absolute sense, but simply that their
comparative gains and losses may be measured relative to some such point. The
points where these utility curves cross the neutral line thus represents the security
level or minimum acceptable solution for each actor, indicated by points a and b.
Thus for actor B any proposed solution to the left of point b would represent a net
loss relative to the status quo. Since B can always insure himself of at least the status
quo by refusing to agree, there is no logical reason for him to accept any solution
falling beyond point b. By the same arguments would presumably refuse to accept
any solutions to the right of point a. Thus the model makes it clear that no rational
actor will accept a settlement which falls below the point of his own security level.
It therefore follows that all agreements must fall within the range between the
minimum acceptable positions of the two actors, and this range may be referred to
as bargaining space.
The bargaining space depicted in this model produces a situation comparable to
that also noted in Figure 5; that there is one point at which the products of the two
individual utilities may be maximized, point E in Figure 6 or point p, which
corresponds to it, in Figure 5. Point £ is not necessarily located halfway between
either the minimum positions of two actors, points a and b, or half way between
their maximum positions, points a' and b'. It is partially a function of these points
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Figure 6. A Simple Bargaining Model
Gains and
Losses
Relative to
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and also of the slope of the utility curves, A - - -A' and B- - -B'. As is also the case
for Figure 5, point £ in Figure 6 does not represent a stable equilibrium since each
actor may be tempted to maximize his outcomes within the available bargaining
space. The ability to move the outcome either to the left, as A prefers, or to the
right, as B prefers, may be a function of strategic influence variables not captured in
the game theoretical model. These strategic factors may contribute to asymmetrical
outcomes in ways which will be discussed in the next section.
Issues in a negotiation, however, are not always characterized by bargaining
space. Figure 7 depicts a case where the utility curves of the two actors intersect
below the neutral point and where there is no overlap of positions between minimum
acceptable agreements, so that all agreements producing gains for A lead to losses
for B and vice versa. In such a case agreement is not possible without violating the
assumption that no actor will settle for a solution that leaves him worse off than he
would be without an agreement, i.e., which leaves him below his security level.
In expanding this basic model to take account of more than two negotiators,
one must introduce the utility curves of all actors whose assent is necessary in
order, .to consummate an agreement. Figure 8 shows the basic bargaining model in
a negotiation with four actors. Utility curves represented by lines C C" and
D- - -D' are also plotted, andc andrf represent the minimum acceptable agreements
for these two new actors. In this case the bargaining space would be reduced by
comparison with that depicted in Figure 6, so that bargaining space would include
only a minimum common denominator of overlapping possible agreement for all
relevant actors. If coalitions have formed, then the actor with the most stringent
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Figure 7. The Absence of Bargaining Space
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Figure 8. An N-Person Bargaining Model
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minimum acceptable position in effect sets the minimum for the coalition as a
whole. In Figure 8, if A andC are allies andfi and/) are also allied, then in effectC
sets the minimum position for his coalition and D sets the minimum for his. Thus
multilateral negotiations are likely to constrain the available bargaining space in that
agreement must be acceptable to all of the participants whose assent is essential.
The strategic or manipulative orientation
The construction of an adequate theory of the role of asymmetry in bargaining
requires the consideration of the use of information manipulation and strategic
devices for influencing the behavior of others. Such a consideration involves an
extension of the game theoretic model to include a more dynamic, process-oriented
approach. Strategic devices may contribute to asymmetrical outcomes in two pri-
mary ways. First, they may be used to affect the information available to
negotiators, by either clarifying or obfuscating the structure of the bargaining situa-
tion. Second, they may be employed to modify the actual structure of the bargaining
situation to induce an actor to accept an agreement which it might otherwise not
prefer.
As Young points out, the strategic approach focuses on interactions in the
presence of conflicts of interests and imperfect information.17 Bargainers may try to
manipulate one another's understanding about the payoffs, and they may even try to
change objective payoffs. Thus manipulative theories are most likely to be appro-
priate to negotiations where extensive communications are possible, such as in the
case of most international negotiations. Young further notes that the manipulative
approach is particularly relevant to asymmetrical bargaining:
bargaining is often casually conceptualized as a phenomenon involving
roughly symmetrical activities on the part of two or more purposive actors.
However, situations involving manipulative bargaining may vary greatly in
these terms. Thus, perfectly symmetrical bargaining is the limiting case in
which the players engage in equal or identical efforts to manipulate the infor-
mation conditions of each other. And perfectly asymmetrical bargaining is the
other limiting case in which only one of the players makes any effort at all to
manipulate the information conditions of the other(s). It seems reasonable to
conclude on a priori grounds that perfectly symmetrical bargaining will seldom
occur in the real world, if only because the resources and personal attributes of
the players are unlikely to be identical. Situations that approximate perfectly
asymmetrical bargaining, on the other hand, are probably more likely to occur
in reality.18
The first means of manipulation noted above is to affect the information avail-
able to players, such as information about utilities. Although the pure game theoret-
ical model assumes that utility schedules are perfectly known to all parties, in
"Young, p. 303.
18Ibid., p. 307.
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international negotiations this is not generally the case. Thus actors may manipulate
others in an effort to deceive them about their own true utilities, especially about
their minimum level for an acceptable agreement. Figure 9 depicts a case in which A
attempts to convince B that his utilities fall along the line A*- - -A*' rather than
along line/4- - -A', where they really fall. If A succeeds in convincing B, then he
may lead B to believe that his minimum acceptable position is at point a*. This
would then move the basic solution point fromis loE*, in a direction favorable ioA.
Although the original outcome would have produced payoffs at level Q for both
players, this new solution would raise the payoff for A to level 5 while reducing the
outcome forfl to level/?. Through manipulating information in this manner, that is
in effect through deception, A could produce an outcome which would provide him
with greater payoffs at B's expense. Thus unequal capabilities to engage in such
deception may produce asymmetrical outcomes.
A second means of manipulation is for one actor to influence another in order
to change his utilities or in order to get him to accept agreements which he might
otherwise not prefer. Theories of the influence process are directly relevant to this
aspect of bargaining. Indeed, a classic definition of influence treats it "as a relation
among actors in which one actor induces other actors to act in some way they would
Figure 9. The Effects of Misinformation
Gains and
Losses
Relative
to
"Status
Quo"
(Vertical
Axis)
Issue
Dimension
(Horizon-
tal Axis)
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not otherwise act."19 Harsanyi has criticized this simplest version of influence on
the grounds that it fails to take into account at least two important considerations.
First, it overlooks the "opportunity cost to A of attempting to influence B's be-
havior."20 Second, it disregards "the opportunity costs to B of refusing to do what
A wants him to do, i.e., of refusing to yield to/4's attempt to influence his be-
havior."21 In other words, it overlooks the fact that the relationship between v4 and
B is bidirectional and that .6 has an option either to accede tO/4's influence attempt
or to resist it. Harsanyi then concludes with a reformulation of the influence rela-
tionship in terms of utilities such as those contained in a game theoretic model of the
bargaining relationship:
A's power over B should be defined not merely as an ability by A to getfi to do
X with a certain probability p, but rather as an ability by A to achieve this at a
certain total cost u to himself, by convincing B that B would have to bear the
total cost v if he did not do X.22
As Harsanyi amplifies this definition, he also stresses that power must be
conceived in a "schedule sense," that is, as a function of the costs of using power in
relation to other dimensions of power such as resources.23 Alker has more recently
suggested that this functional treatment of influence relationships should take ac-
count of contingencies which may alter the nature of the functional relationships
among "power amounts, effects, scopes, extents, strengths, net inducements, net
gains, and influencer costs."24 All of these considerations may be reflected in the
utility schedules and base points of the basic bargaining model depicted in Figure 6.
Harsanyi indicated, for example, that the Nash bargaining model provides a
framework capable of treating the bilateral nature of influence relationships.25
Other aspects of contingent relationships may be accounted for by the em-
ployment, generally at some cost, of manipulative devices to influence the net
balance of costs and gains from an outcome at any point along the issue dimension
for parties to a negotiation. The decision to employ strategic devices may reflect a
decision to convert the potential power of one party into actual power through the
issuing of a commitment, a threat, or a promise in order to induce change in the
bargaining behavior of other parties. Furthermore, as Knorr points out the external
conditions (such as events in the international or domestic environments) "deter-
19Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 40.
20John Harsanyi, "The Measurement of Social Power," in Martin Shubik, ed., Game Theory and
Related Approaches to Social Behavior (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964), p. 186.
2IIbid., p. 186.
22Ibid., p. 187.
23lbid., pp. 194-95.
24Hayward R. Alker, "On Political Capabilities in a Schedule Sense: Measuring Power, Integration,
and Development," in H.R. Alker, K.W. Deutsch, and A.H. Stoetzel, eds., Mathematical Approaches
to Politics (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc., 1973), p. 326.
25Harsanyi, pp. 198-206.
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Asymmetrical bargaining in the CSCE 159
mining the conversion of putative power into actualized power may change during
the time of the bargaining process."26 Thus the dynamic aspects of the bargaining
process, those aspects which make a negotiation something more than the "discov-
ery" of an abstract "agreement point," are likely to be captured from the analysis
of manipulative devices through which negotiators attempt to influence one another.
One of the most common strategic devices is the commitment, a firm statement
by a negotiator that he will not compromise beyond a certain specified point.
Commitments serve several functions in bargaining. In "integrative" bargaining
they may be used by the parties as a device for communicating the level of minimum
acceptable agreements. In this respect they may be used to improve the state of
information. On the other hand, in "distributive" bargaining the commitment may
be used by each party in trying to exaggerate its minimum level of agreement in a
direction favorable to the party employing it. In this case commitments may be used
to reinforce deceptive manipulations of the type discussed earlier. Thus, if A tries to
commit himself to a position just to the right of b in Figure 6 and is successful in
doing so, then B has no choice but to accept an agreement there at little gain for
himself and at a substantial gain for A. Actors may try to make their commitments
credible by engaging in actions preventing themselves from compromising, figura-
tively "burning their bridges behind them."27
There are several paradoxes in the use of commitments. For one thing, if both
parties use them simultaneously, they may create a situation like that depicted in
Figure 7 where there is no overlapping bargaining space. If these commitments are
believed to represent true minimal conditions by both sides, then the actors may
simply break off negotiations. Thus a stalemate would result even though in princi-
ple both actors could have gained from an agreement. If the commitments are not
believed, then concessions may commence. But the first concession is hard to make
since the side making it reveals that its commitments were not really valid. The first
concession may thus reduce the credibility of further commitments, leading to a
chain reaction of concessions, usually producing asymmetrical outcomes.
Another possible source of difficulty in the use of commitments is that each
party may not be aware prior to their use, if ever, of the true utilities of the other
party. Thus one side may misjudge the minimum acceptable position of the other
side and commit itself to a more extreme position. In Figure 6, if A committed
himself to a point left of b, then .6 would find agreement at this point unacceptable.
This would then leave A with the hard choice of either scuttling the potentially
profitable agreement or beginning a chain of concessions which could eventually
leave him worse off than if he had never made such an overly ambitious commit-
26Klaus Knorr, The Power of Nations: The Political Economy of International Relations (New York:
Basic Books, 1975), p.20.
"On this point see the discussion of bargaining power in Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, I960), pp. 22-28.
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ment in the first place.28 As Schelling observes, commitments "run the risk of
establishing an immovable position that goes beyond the ability of the other to
concede, and thereby provoke the likelihood of stalemate or breakdown."29
Commitments may thus bring about asymmetrical outcomes in negotiations in
several ways. First, they give an advantage to the intelligent bargainer who can use
them judiciously. An actor who can commit himself credibly without becoming
overcommitted will generally have a significant advantage in influencing the out-
comes. Second, an actor willing to run the risk of a breakdown of negotiations
through his commitments may also have an advantage. An actor's commitment will
be more credible if the costs to the actor of sticking to his commitments, even at the
risk of stalemate, are relatively low. Thus commitments should generally reinforce
the tendency already noted in the game theoretic model to give an advantage in
bargaining to the player with the lowest costs from noncooperative outcomes.
The second bargaining strategy is the threat, which may be subdivided into two
classes. The first class is a threat by one party to cut off negotiations and to leave
both parties at the status quo. Thus, with regard to the diagram in Figure 6, A may
threaten B by saying that unless B accepts a solution just to the right of point b, he
will break off negotiations and leave B at point b, which is worse for him than any
point to the right of b where he would make at least some profit, regardless of how
small. This type of threat is essentially the same as that discussed by Nash and other
game theorists.
A second class of threat goes beyond the bounds of the original game and
introduces the notion of side payments. In this case A may tellB that, ifB does not
agree to a solution favored by A, then A will remove a reward or apply a punish-
ment. This in effect alters the nature of the game by increasing the costs of nona-
greement relative to agreement forB. This is depicted in Figure 10 as a movement
of his utility curve prior to the threat (B B') in a northwesterly direction after the
threat (8* B*'). In this case the new point of agreement which would maximize
joint utilities is moved well to the left in the direction favored by A. A may now even
be able to get a solution to the left of b, which would previously have been
unacceptable toB. Furthermore,/4's payoffs increase from Q to/?. Because of the
increased costs of nonagreement for B, a solution at this point is now profitable in
comparison with no agreement, although in terms of the pre-threat utilities his
payoffs are reduced from Q to S, a negative result.
The success of a threat depends upon several things. It depends heavily on the
credibility of the threat, namely whether or not B believes that A will carry it out.
B's expected utility curve will generally move only as a function of the cost of the
threat toB times B's perception of the probability that.4 will carry it out. Thus, as
28Although this latter argument is partly consistent with the so-called "falling domino" theory so
widely propagated by American official spokesmen during the Vietnam war, it also makes it clear that an
actor can bring such a phenomenon on itself through committing itself to a position which goes beyond
the realistic possibility of concessions by the other party.
29Schelling, p. 28.
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Figure 10. The Effects of Threats and Promises
161
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Schelling remarks, "The threat is ineffectual unless the threatener can rearrange or
display his own incentives so as to demonstrate that he would, ex post, have an
incentive to carry it out."30 Furthermore, A must convince B that he has the cap-
abilities to carry out a threat. To this degree, at least, the party with the greater
resource base is at an advantage in its ability to threaten credibly. Also important is
the bargaining reputation of the threatener, namely whether or not he is known to
carry out his threats and has an incentive to do so. Finally, a party may be more
successful in the use of threats to change utilities if it is willing to run the risk of
having his bluff called, thus leading not only to the need to execute the threat but
also to the absence of an agreement which might otherwise have been profitable.
Once again, the party with more to lose from the failure to cooperate is left at a
disadvantage when it comes to the use of threats because he may be reluctant to run
the risk of nonagreement if his bluff is called and the threatened party refuses to
concede.
A number of social-psychological studies have looked at the effects of threats
upon bargaining in laboratory experiments. Although the results of this research are
sometimes weak and divergent, there does seem to be some consensus that threats
may be functional for communications in "integrative" bargaining situations. In
this case, they may be used to mark emphatically minimum positions and thus help
to clarify the range of available bargaining space. In "distributive" bargaining,
however, threats may produce results which will be less than Pareto-optimal, that is,
which will reduce the joint payoffs for both parties. In this respect, they may lead to
outcomes which are somewhat different from those which would be predicted by
*Ibid., p. 36.
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162 International Organization
"pure" game theory in the absence of strategic considerations. When threats are
used by one party only, they will reduce the payoffs less of the party using them
than of his victim. In this context, they will tend to lead to more asymmetrical
outcomes, although both parties are likely to be less well off than if threats had
never been employed.31
The third strategic device is the promise, which is the logical inverse of the
threat. In a promise party A may inform B that, if he accepts an agreement at a point
favored by A, then^4 will provide him with a reward or remove a punishment. This
has the effect of raising the gains of agreement relative to no agreement. Relative to
the neutral point in Figure 10, it has the same effect as a threat, namely to mover's
utility curve in a northwesterly direction. It differs from a threat only in that a
promise adds to the gains associated with an agreement, whereas a threat adds to the
costs of nonagreement. Like a threat, however, it may open up new possibilities for
agreement. In addition its success depends heavily on the credibility which the
recipient places in it. This is likely to be a function as well of the past performance
of the promiser in executing promises and of the resources available for carrying out
the promises.
Theoretical conclusions
The attempt thus far has been to outline a tentative theoretical conceptualiza-
tion of bargaining under conditions of structural asymmetry. This discussion began
with a simple game theoretical formulation which suggested that asymmetrical
outcomes in negotiations could be predicted on the basis of the relative costs to
negotiators of noncooperative outcomes, represented by the status quo point as well
as by the threat to be left at one's own security level. This formal conceptualization
was then translated into a basic bargaining model which was more directly applica-
ble to international negotiations. Such a conceptualization introduced dynamic ele-
ments of the bargaining process, especially the employment of manipulative tech-
niques for modifying actors' information or their utilities. Thus the ability to influ-
ence the behavior of another actor is an important factor affecting the symmetry or
asymmetry of bargaining outcomes. Although the theoretical conceptualization
drew upon several different theoretical traditions, there was a convergence around
several propositions which are at least logically consistent with the basic assump-
tions of the conceptual framework. The following propositions, then, emerge:
1) Negotiations will tend to result in asymmetrical outcomes favoring the
negotiating party which has:
a) the least losses associated with being left at the status quo point of
nonagreement, or
3IFor a review of this laboratory research see Jack Sawyer and Harold Guetzkow, "Bargaining and
Negotiation in International Relations," in Herbert Kelman, ed., International Behavior (New York:
Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965), pp. 508-11, and Daniel Druckman, Human Factors in International
Negotiation: Social Psychological Aspects of International Conflict (Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage Profes-
sional Papers in International Studies, 1973), pp. 68-74.
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Asymmetrical bargaining in the CSCE 163
b) the least losses resulting from being threatened to be left at his own
security level.
2) Negotiations will tend to result in asymmetrical outcomes favoring the
negotiating party which has:
a) the greatest resources available to reinforce his strategic behavior,
including commitments, threats, and promises, or
b) the least losses in the event that the use of strategic devices results in a
stalemate, thus leaving him at the status quo point of nonagreement
(i.e., the same result as that predicted in 1-a above).
Having explored some of the logical foundations of these propositions, in the
next section I will investigate their empirical plausibility through a case study of the
negotiations on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
/ / / An empirical application: "basket one" of the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe
Background to the CSCE negotiations
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was the first
all-European multilateral conference since World War II, with the objective of
improving relations among European states on a wide range of issues. The confer-
ence was composed of 35 participants, including all states of Europe plus the United
States and Canada. Although it was itself a conference of limited duration and thus
does not formally constitute an international organization, it was the aim of its
proponents to create a new, multilateral system of security in Europe. In this sense
the CSCE may be considered as a proto-international organization, in that many
participants want to establish this new system of interaction on an ongoing basis.
Although they did not rely heavily on an institutional structure at the outset, a
decision was made to hold a review conference in Belgrade in 1977, thus establish-
ing the principle that participants might meet at regular intervals to review progress
and to update and strengthen the final act. In short, the CSCE purports to have laid
the basis for a European-wide security system. At the time of this writing it is not
possible to tell whether it will evolve into a more enduring and formal organization,
perhaps supplanting or at least reducing the role of the military alliances and the
economic blocs in European political affairs.
The CSCE is a good case for the application of a theory of negotiations
focusing on the concept of asymmetry. Although the Conference was formally
composed of 35 sovereign and independent entities, its members in fact tended to
caucus in blocs, including the two alliances of NATO and the Warsaw Pact plus a
group of nonaligned states. On a number of occasions within these caucuses dis-
putes evidently arose between the bloc leaders and their smaller allies. In addition, a
good deal of bargaining took place between the two major power blocs and the third
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164 International Organization
group of nonaligned states. The nonaligned states of Europe, of course, did not
differ significantly from most of the aligned states on categories of wealth and
national power, with the exception of the two superpowers. Thus their role was
somewhat different from that of the nonaligned actors in more universal bodies such
as the United Nations. Furthermore this group, which included Yugoslavia and
Spain, was not ideologically homogeneous. Nonetheless, these nations did share a
common structural role and often did act in concert to modify the positions of the
power blocs or to mediate between them. Thus the role which these nations played
in the CSCE may give some indication of the degree to which the less powerful
nations, both in terms of their own resources and their potential to aggregate their
resources with those of their allies, were able to influence the more powerful bloc
actors in the negotiations.
The negotiations began at the preparatory level in November 1972, though they
were officially inaugurated at a meeting of foreign ministers at Helsinki in July
1973. A working phase then began in Geneva in September 1973 and continued
through July 19, 1975, when it was announced that a final document would be
signed in Helsinki on July 31-August 1, 1975. The final document contained three
parts or "baskets," the first dealing with "security in Europe," the second with
cooperation in the fields of economics, science, technology, and the environment,
and a third treating cooperation in humanitarian concerns.
The focus here will be on the negotiations on the first of these major headings,
the question of security in Europe. This section dealt with three broad categories of
issues. The first involved a declaration of ten "principles guiding relations between
[sic] states," including respect for sovereignty, refraining from the use of force, use
of peaceful means to settle disputes, non-intervention in internal affairs, respect for
human rights, and abidance by the rules of international law. The second section
dealt with certain confidence-building measures (CBM's) designed to improve
mutual trust among the states of Europe. This included provisions for the prior
notification of major military maneuvers, the voluntary notification of major mili-
tary movements, and finally some general declarations about detente and disarma-
ment. A third issue, which did not find its way into the final agreement, centered
around a project promoted by the Swiss to establish procedures for the peaceful
settlement of disputes.
The goal of the CSCE was to arrive at an agreement that could be signed by all
participants. Thus unanimity among the 35 participants was generally required in
order to reach agreement. Of course, this doesn't mean that every country agreed
entirely with every provision, as there were some tradeoffs where countries sac-
rificed a preferred position on one issue in order to win their position on another
issue. But in general the final act is reflective of the "lowest common denominator"
of agreement which was required in order to achieve such unanimity.
Research procedures
There are a number of significant problems with applying a conceptualization
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Asymmetrical bargaining in the CSCE 165
of negotiations based on game theory to "real world" international negotiations.
While the game theoretic orientation and its extension in theories of bargaining
strategy and the social psychology of bargaining may be suggestive of hypotheses,
the problems with operationalizing the crucial variables identified by such theories
are extremely severe. This study is no exception to this generalization, as very grave
problems of variable operationalization have been encountered. Since there is no
good method currently available to measure utilities, for example, one must do the
best one can to estimate these on the basis of rather scanty information. In this
research, extensive interviews with various participants in the CSCE negotiations
were conducted both in the course of the negotiations in 1974 and afterwards in
1975-76. This provided some clues to the relative preferences of the actors, though
it did not supply any clearcut method for precisely measuring utilities. Therefore,
we must settle for relatively rough measures of this concept and of others in the
theory. I shall attempt throughout, however, to evaluate the plausibility of the
hypotheses not only in the light of some tentative "tests" of these hypotheses but in
the context of a qualitative examination of them as well.
The hypotheses suggested two basic independent variables. The first is the
"threat potential" of the participants as reflected in their utility schedules. Although
this variable enters in somewhat different forms in propositions 1-a, 1-b, and 2-b,
these differences are too subtle to be identified empirically by any available research
strategy. Therefore, we have been forced to consider only an approximation of the
losses which each nation would receive from an outcome of no agreement relative to
what they might achieve by an agreement. Although there are many differences
among the states of Europe in this regard, most of the major differences appear to be
closely related to structural differences, to the different roles which these states
played in the international system. Such structural distinctions no doubt mask many
important differences; nevertheless, one of the most interesting aspects of these
negotiations was the manner in which nations with quite different ideological orien-
tations, such as Spain and Yugoslavia, managed to cooperate closely, largely on the
basis of shared structural roles in the conference. The following categories have
been constructed, ranging from those states which appear to be the most dissatisfied
with the status quo and thus are likely to receive the greatest losses from the failure
to agree (category 1) to those which are most satisfied and would stand to lose the
least from the failure to reach a cooperative outcome (category 5).
Category 1: The nonaligned nations, which often feel trapped between the two
superpower alliances in Europe: Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Liechtenstein,
Malta, Monaco, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Yugoslavia, and the
Holy See.
Category 2: The divided states, which were left in a so-called "artificial"
situation following World War II: the Federal Republic of Germany and the German
Democratic Republic.
Category 3: The most restless members of the two alliances, seeking the
greatest degree of independence from the superpowers: France and Rumania.
Category 4: The other nonsuperpower members of the two alliances: Belgium,
Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary,
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766 International Organization
Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, and Tur-
key.
Category 5: The two superpowers which desire to retain some degree of domi-
nation over their European clients: the Soviet Union and the United States.
The second independent variable, included in proposition 2-a, is the resources
which the participants can bring to bear to support influence attempts.32 Data were
collected on both general economic and human resources as well as certain military
resources, since these negotiations were very much involved with military and
strategic considerations. These include general economic strength indicators (GNP,
population, and GNP per capita) and general indicators of military strength (total
military expenditures, military expenditures/GNP, the size of the armed forces, and
military expenditures per capita).33 Finally, since I was primarily concerned with
security within Europe, I also looked at similar indicators of military resources for
the European area only (armed forces stationed in Europe, divisions stationed in
Europe, tanks stationed in Europe, and air forces stationed in Europe).34
The dependent variable, influence over the outcome of the negotiations, was
also difficult to measure. I have, however, been able to trace the original authorship
of many sections of the CSCE final act for "basket one'' on the basis of a limited set
of documents produced by the working subcommittee in Geneva.35 I have thus
computed the number of words in the Final Act's section on Principles and on
Confidence Building Measures that each country first introduced, assuming that the
portion of the text authored by each country is a rough indicator of its influence in
the final deliberations. There are some distinct problems with this procedure, how-
ever. First, only about 50 percent of the text could be traced to a specific country.
The remainder was attributed in the coding to the subcommittee as a whole, al-
though this included language on major provisions evidently worked out in purely
verbal sessions without any written proposals, as well as simple changes in the text
introduced by the committee for reasons of grammar or style. Furthermore, there
was evidently some division of labor within the bloc caucuses, as on various issues
one country was apparently chosen to present the position of its bloc. Thus it was
32lt is evident that resources can provide only a partial indicator of the ability to influence, and that
conceptualizations of influence based upon resources must also deal with this concept only in what Alker,
pp. 330-32, has described as an "incomplete point sense." Nevertheless, more complex conceptions of
power are extremely difficult if not impossible to operationalize, so for the moment we must employ
merely a rough indicator of influence capability treated in a relatively simple conceptual sense.
33These data were obtained from the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military
Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1965-1974 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1976); all data are from 1974.
MThese data were from World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRl Yearbook 1974 (Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 1974); they apply only to the members of the NATO alliance and the Warsaw Treaty
Organization.
^The following documents were examined: CSCE Documents 11/A/1 (19 September 1973) through
II/A/36 (6 June 1975); II/A/101 (8 February 1974) through II/A/138 (1 April 1975); II/C/I (19 September
1973) through II/C/17 (12 March 1974); II/C/101 (13 March 1974) through II/C/121 (20 July 1975).
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Asymmetrical bargaining in the CSCE 167
often difficult to tell whether a particular draft was presented on a purely national
initiative or as a result of caucus deliberations. In these cases, since these nations
were not formally acting on behalf of blocs, the text has been coded as having been
authored by the individual country. Finally, the percentage of the text authored,
even if the data were fully accurate, is not an ideal indicator of the amount of
influence over the final agreement. Since no better indicator was readily available,
this has been used as a rough approximation of influence, although the limitations of
this indicator must clearly be kept in mind in evaluating the results.
Due to the severe limitations of this analysis, however, several significant,
sensitive, and highly debated issues were also selected for qualitative analysis. This
type of analysis is patterned roughly after that of Dahl in his studies of community
power,36 although an attempt has been made to take account of some of the most
significant criticisms of these procedures. In this analysis I shall look for any
significant indications of the exercise of asymmetrical influence in the bargaining
over several crucial issues, some of which are not reflected in the final act.
The textual analysis
The basic results of this analysis of the CSCE texts for "basket one" are
presented in Table 1. A quick observation of this table indicates that six countries
accounted for 77 percent of the attributable text and 38 percent of the entire text:
Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, and the
United States. One factor accounting for this result is that the conference did often
operate on a bloc basis in spite of pretensions to the contrary. Thus one or two
countries were often the primary spokespersons for their bloc on most issues.
The results for the hypothesis about the role of "threat potential" in influenc-
ing the outcomes of the CSCE are noted in Table 2. Here it is evident that the
category 5 nations, the two superpowers, did exert the greatest average influence on
the agreement as predicted. On the other hand, the category 3 group, composed of
the alliance mavericks, France and Rumania, was somewhat more influential than
predicted. Although the average influence of the nonaligned nations was relatively
low, as predicted, there were several exceptions here with Yugoslavia being the
most notable case. The Yugoslavs were the original authors of approximately 20
percent of the identifiable text in spite of being in a relatively weak position in terms
of both threat potential and resources. On the other hand, the Yugoslavs apparently
perceived considerable positive gain from an agreement which may have encour-
aged them to take a considerably more active role in the conference than most other
nations, and this seems to have produced results in this case which contradict the
hypothesis about low threat potential leading to low effectiveness in influencing
outcomes. The Yugoslavs viewed the CSCE as a means to begin the breakup of the
*See Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1961).
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Table 1 National contribution to the text of "basket
one" of CSCE
Country D
Yugoslavia
USSR
Great Britain
France
Belgium
United States
Rumania
Sweden
GDR
Austria
Cyprus
Finland
Switzerland
Poland
Malta
Netherlands
Spain
FRG
Holy See
Turkey
Italy
SUBTOTAL
Subcommittee
261
101
62
172
116
18
20
0
33
0
0
0
0
0
14
13
3
8
7
7
4
839
861
30
135.5
173
0
0
44.5
24
41
0
30
30
30
30
27
0
0
10
0
0
0
0
605
603
291
236.5
235
172
116
62.5
44
41
33
30
30
30
30
27
14
13
13
8
7
7
4
1444
1464
10.01
8.13
8.08
5.91
3.99
2.15
.51
.41
.13
.03
.03
.03
1.03
0.93
0.48
0.45
0.45
0.28
0.24
0.24
0.14
49.65
50.35
20.15
16.38
16.27
11.91
8.03
4.33
3.05
2.84
2.29
2.08
2.08
2.08
2.08
1.87
0.97
0.90
0.90
0.55
0.48
0.48
0.28
100.00
—
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
11.5
11.5
11.5
11.5
14
15
16.5
16.5
18
19.5
19.5
21
TOTAL 1700 1208 2908 100.00 100.00
Explanation of columns:
A) Number of words of text authored in section of CSCE on ' 'Principles Guiding
Relations between Participating States."
B) Number of words of text authored in section of CSCE on "Confidence-
Building Measures.. . ."
Q Total number of words attributed to nation in "basket one" of CSCE.
D) Percentage of total text authored by each nation.
E) Percentage of attributable text authored by each nation.
F) Rank-order of frequency of contribution to text.
Table 2 Average number of words authored by nations in each
category of "threat potential"
Category 1:
Category 2:
Category 3:
Category 4:
Category 5:
Percent of words
37.4
20.5
108.0
25.1
149.5
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Asymmetrical bargaining in the CSCE 169
bloc structures which have dominated Europe since the end of World War II. They
felt that this infringed upon the natural interactions of independent states, and they
hoped that the CSCE would begin to restructure European relations on a multilateral
basis. To advance these principles Yugoslavia became a leader among the non-
aligned nations, assuming a role traditionally taken by Sweden in arms control
conferences, although the latter nation was the second ranking contributor among
the nonaligned states to this part of the CSCE.
According to these indicators, the least influential states on the average
were the two Germanies, with only 41 words credited to them combined, totalling
less than 3 percent of the identifiable text. By contrast, the major exception to the
hypothesis as already noted was for the case of France and Rumania, which together
accounted for 216 words of text or over 13 percent of the identifiable total. Like
Yugoslavia, both probably played an active role in order to further their goal of
using the CSCE as a means for breaking up tight bloc structures in Europe, which
both viewed as providing excessive constraints on their freedom of action.
Turning next to the hypothesis about structural factors, one must look primarily
at resources as a rough indicator of the ability to employ credible bargaining
strategies and thereby exert influence, although I am aware of the limitation of
treating power relations solely in "an incomplete point sense."37 The results are
displayed in Table 3. Pearson product-moment correlations are calculated between a
variety of resource indicators and the text authorship, including the entire "basket
one" text, as well as a breakdown of the text for the part dealing only with
principles and the part dealing with confidence-building measures. Among the
Table 3 Correlations (and significance levels) between text authorship
and indicators of national resources
Textual provisions
RESOURCE INDICATORS
Military expenditure
Mil. expenditure/GNP
Total armies
Mil. expenditures/capita
Annies in Europe
Divisions in Europe
Tanks in Europe
Mil. aircraft in Europe
GNP
GNP/capita
Population
ENTIRE TEXT
.35(p=.12)
.38(p=.10)*
.41(p=.O7)*
.34(p=.13)
.28(p=.37)
.24(p=.46)
.40(p=.20)
.57(p=.O5)**
.22(p=.36)
-.01(p=.97)
.37(p=.lO)*
PRINCIPLES TEXT
.13(p=.58)
.25(p=.29)
.19(p=.42)
.13(p=.58)
.17(p=.6O)
.00(p=1.00)
.ll(p=.73)
.28(p=.37)
.O6(p=.8O)
-.07(p=.78)
.14(p=.54)
CBM'S TEXT
.49(p=.O2)**
.35(p=.13)
.51(p=.O2)**
.46(p= .03)**
.26(p=.41)
.36(p=.26)
.49(p=.10)*
.58(p=.05)**
.33(p=.16)
.O8(p=.73)
.5O(p=.O2)**
*p=s .10.
**p =s .05.
37Alker, p. 326.
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770 International Organization
general resource variables, only population was significantly related to the author-
ship of the text, and this relationship was strong only with regard to the CBM part of
the text. In general, then, more populous nations exerted a greater impact on the
outcome of negotiations than did smaller ones. However, neither GNP nor GNP per
capita was significantly related to the negotiation outcome. In this correlation, there
are three significant outliers which probably drastically reduced the level of the
relationship. Yugoslavia and Rumania both made a positive contribution to the
Helsinki agreement greater than would have been predicted on the basis of their
resources, whereas West Germany made a substantially less significant contribution
than would have been predicted.
Turning next to the measures of military strength, Table 3 indicates somewhat
stronger relationships in a number of cases, although all relationships are strongest
for the portion of the text dealing explicitly with military matters, namely the
section on confidence-building measures. Here relationships are significant at better
than the .05 level for total military expenditures, military expenditures per capita,
total size of the army, and the number of aircraft stationed in Europe. Since the
Helsinki agreement dealt particularly with military maneuvers and troop movements
in Europe, it is not very surprising that the most militarily powerful nations would
have exerted the greatest impact over this section of the final act.
To summarize the results thus far, it is apparent that the variable of "threat
potential," albeit very crudely measured, seemed to account to some degree for
outcomes in "basket one" of the CSCE better than general indicators of resources
or power base. The one real exception, however, is that on issues dealing specifi-
cally with military security, the militarily most powerful nations clearly seemed to
exert the greatest influence over the outcomes. In this case the basic structural
asymmetries among the participating nations seem to have had a significant impact.
Finally, an examination of the data broken down by blocs, as presented in
Table 4, may suggest several other interesting conclusions. First, the nonaligned
bloc together accounted for just about one-third of the attributable text, with Yugos-
lavia accounting for almost 60 percent of that figure. Thus any negative impact of
the lack of resources or threat potential by these nations may have been offset by the
positive benefits which they saw emerging from such an agreement and con-
sequently by their activism both as mediators between the two "Cold War" blocs
and as initiators of positions not taken by either of these two opposing blocs.
Second, comparing the impact of the two traditional alliances, it is clear that NATO
was more influential overall than the Warsaw Pact, with the former accounting for
42.8 percent of the attributable text and the latter only 23.6 percent. Of course, one
must recall that there were 15 NATO nations participating in the CSCE against 7
Warsaw Pact nations. Perhaps their greater number combined with greater overall
resources and threat potential enabled them to exert a substantial impact on the
conference. Third, the distribution of influence as reflected in text authorship
among the NATO nations is generally fairly even among four nations which ac-
counted together for about 95 percent of the total NATO contribution. By contrast,
the Soviet Union itself accounted for almost 70 percent of the Warsaw Pact con-
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Table 4 Data broken down on a bloc-by-bloc basis
A) NATO: Words Percent of NATO-authored text
United Kingdom 235 38.1%
France 172 27.9%
Belgium 116 18.8%
United States 62.5 10.1%
Netherlands 13 2.1%
FRG 8 1.3%
Turkey 7 1.1%
Italy 4 0.6%
TOTAL 617.5 100%
NATO PERCENT OF TOTAL TEXT: 42.8%
B) WARSAW PACT Words Percent of Warsaw Pact-authored text
69.5%
12.9%
9.7%
7.9%
TOTAL 340.5 100%
WARSAW PACT PERCENT OF TOTAL TEXT: 23.6%
Percent of non-aligned-authored text
59.9%
8.4%
6.2%
6.2%
6.2%
6.2%
2.9%
2.7%
1.4%
TOTAL 486 100%
NONALIGNED PERCENT OF TOTAL TEXT: 33.7%
Soviet Union
Rumania
GDR
Poland
236.5
44
33
27
C) NONAUGNED
Yugoslavia
Sweden
Austria
Finland
Cyprus
Switzerland
Malta
Spain
Holy See
Wot
291
41
30
30
30
30
14
13
7
ht
tp
s:
//
do
i.o
rg
/1
0.
10
17
/S
00
20
81
83
00
00
38
91
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fr
om
 h
tt
ps
:/
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e.
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f B
as
el
 L
ib
ra
ry
, o
n 
11
 Ju
l 2
01
7 
at
 0
7:
30
:3
9,
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 th
e 
C
am
br
id
ge
 C
or
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 u
se
, a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
ps
:/
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e/
te
rm
s.
172 International Organization
tribution, thus dominating its bloc more clearly than any single nation dominated the
NATO bloc. There are several possible explanations for the more direct and
dominating role played by the Soviet Union in these negotiations in comparison
with the United States. The Soviet Union does seem to dominate its Eastern Euro-
pean allies to a greater degree than the United States dominates its allies in Western
Europe. In addition, the Soviet Union had a more direct interest in the issues before
the CSCE, which was basically a conference of European states. The USSR thus
participated actively in the discussion of all issues since it would be directly affected
by all of the provisions of the agreement. By contrast, the United States was a
participant in these negotiations only as a result of a special invitation, largely
because of the US role in Germany and of the presence of US troops in Europe. The
Americans thus tried to avoid playing an excessively active role except on those
issues, such as the CBMs, which affected them directly.
Analysis of selected critical issues
One major limitation of the analysis undertaken so far is that it takes into
account only the positive contributions made to the outcome of the negotiations as
reflected in the final text. Yet numerous studies of power and influence have
suggested that asymmetries may be best reflected not in the power over specific
positive decisions but in negative power, including the power to veto proposals or
the power to prevent decisions from ever being made, the "power of non-
decision-making."38 Although the data are not available to give a systematic test to
the hypothesis about asymmetrical bargaining in this sense, it is possible to under-
take a qualitative analysis of the decisions and "non-decisions" on several hotly
contested issues in the CSCE on the basis of evidence obtained from CSCE working
documents and from interviews with participants.
I shall first examine some disputes concerning several of the ten "principles"
about security in Europe. The first principle, dealing with "sovereign equality,
respect for rights inherent in sovereignty," provided the basis for several disputes.
In particular, Rumania made several significant proposals for this section which did
not appear in the final text. These Rumanian proposals included the right of all
states to participate equally in "the solution of all problems pertaining to security
and cooperation in Europe," respect by every state for all aspects of the individual
character of every other state, and the respect of "the sovereign right to make use of
the natural and other resources within its territory in a manner corresponding to its
interests."39
These proposals were clearly intended to enhance Rumanian independence
from Soviet domination of bloc affairs. Although there is no direct evidence to
38Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "Decisions and Non-Decisions: An Analytical Framework,"
American Political Science Review, Vol. 57 (September 1963).
39CSCE Document 11/A/18, 28 January 1974.
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Asymmetrical bargaining in the CSCE 173
indicate why these provisions were not adopted, it is likely that the Soviet Union
effectively exercised a veto over the inclusion of these provisions.
One of the most important issues of the CSCE also arose over one sentence in
principle 1 concerning national boundaries. The wording of the final agreement was
suggested by an American draft: "They [the participating States] consider that their
frontiers can be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means
and by agreement."40 The government of the Federal Republic of Germany issued
what amounted to a threat by making the acceptance of this principle an absolute
condition for their acceptance of principles, especially the third, concerning "the
inviolability of frontiers." This provision, however, did not appear in any commit-
tee drafts prior to the final one, suggesting that it was heavily debated. The West
Germans, however, insisted upon maintaining some possibility for the peaceful
reunification of Germany, to avoid the charge domestically that they were ratifying
in the CSCE the permanent division of the. country. Since a CSCE agreement
without the participation of the US or the FRG would have been dramatically
weakened, it is likely that they were able to get their way on this issue in spite of the
opposition of the Warsaw Pact states. This is one case in which only a very small
number of words of text was involved but where the threat potential of the two most
powerful Western nations was brought to bear successfully in one of the most hotly
debated issues considered for "basket one" of the CSCE.
With regard to the second principle, that of "refraining from the threat or use
of force," another Rumanian proposal of some import was vetoed. This extended
the principle of the non-use of force to include nonintervention in civil wars. In a
draft proposal on this principle the Rumanians suggested the following provisions:
"The participating States shall also refrain from organizing and encouraging acts of
civil war, participating in them, assisting them or tolerating on their own territory
activities organized with a view to perpetuating such acts, when the acts mentioned
involve the use or threat of force."41 This proposal clearly contradicted the so-called
"Brezhnev doctrine" used to justify, among other things, Warsaw Pact intervention
in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Thus one can presume again that the USSR was not
prepared to accept an agreement containing such provisions. In this they probably
had at least the tacit support of other ruling Communist party governments in
Eastern Europe and perhaps of some Western countries which also tend to view any
civil war or other domestic instability as potentially undesirable sources of interna-
tional instability.
On the fifth principle dealing with the "peaceful settlement of disputes," the
Swiss delegation presented a lengthy proposal regarding the establishment of com-
plex machinery for settling disputes in Europe.42 This proposal specifically dealt
with the use of negotiations, conciliation, and arbitration for the settlement of
"CSCE Document II/A/30/Rev. 1, 17 March 1975.
41CSCE Document 11/A/l 14, 25 February 1974.
42CSCE Document II/B/1.
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disputes. The proposal was opposed by several states, especially by the Soviet
Union, and the Swiss were successful in obtaining only a commitment to have a
meeting of experts to prepare a position on this issue to be presented to the 1977
review conference. Although in this case the veto was not absolute, it was sufficient
to postpone the specific discussion of this issue. It was thus possible for the USSR
and other opponents of this proposal to get a CSCE agreement which did not contain
this provision, once again preventing a nonaligned proposal from being adopted.
The first part of the section on confidence-building measures dealt with the
notification of any large scale military maneuvers held on the territory of all partici-
pants within Europe. Here there were some differences over the definition of a
major maneuver, finally settled at a threshold of 25,000 troops; over the territory to
be covered in the USSR which extends beyond Europe, settled at a distance of 250
kilometers from its border with any other participating European state; and the
amount of time in advance that notification should be given, finally set at 21 days or
more. All of these issues, however, were settled by compromise since these were
questions on which it was relatively easy to proceed by "splitting the difference."
The issue of the exchange of observers at these maneuvers did create some
divisions along "East-West" lines. The USSR contended that observers should be
exchanged by "invitation" and "under mutually acceptable conditions."43 On the
other hand, the British proposed that each participating state "will invite each other
on a bilateral basis to send observers... ."44 Although both texts were similar, the
Soviets emphasized the voluntariness of the invitation whereas the British em-
phasized its imperativeness. The result reflected a position suggested by six
nonaligned nations: Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, and Yugo-
slavia, to make the invitation by each participating state "at its own discretion, as a
sign of goodwill and with due regard to reciprocity. . . . "4 5 Thus on this crucial issue
the position of the Soviet Union tended to prevail, although the nonaligned nations
suggested a compromise wording which made the proposal acceptable to the West.
The next issue on CBMs involved the notification of major military
movements. Specific proposals calling for the required notification of all large-scale
movements of force in Europe were presented by Great Britain46 and by the six
nonaligned nations referred to earlier.47 These provisions were explicitly supported
by Rumania,48 Yugoslavia,49 Norway,50 Belgium,51 and the Federal Republic of
Germany.52 Although none of the Warsaw Pact nations commented on this proposal
43CSCE Document II/C/1, 19 September 1973.
"CSCE Document II/C/12, 4 February 1974.
45CSCE Document Il/C/13, 19 February 1974.
46CSCE Document 1I/C/12, 4 February 1974.
47CSCE Document II/C/13, 19 February 1974.
48CSCE Document II/C/2 21 September 1973.
49CSCE Document II/C/3 24 September 1973.
50CSCE Document II/C/4, 26 September 1973.
51CSCE Document II/C/10, 7 December 1973.
52CSCE Document II/C/11, 21 January 1974.
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Asymmetrical bargaining in the CSCE 175
in writing except for Rumania, this provision was favored by virtually all partici-
pants in the CSCE except two, the United States and the Soviet Union. This is
perhaps the most dramatic case in "basket one" of the CSCE of the appearance of
the so-called "superpower condominium." Yet these two nations together were
effectively able to reduce the provisions in the final document to a possibility of
notification by participating states "at their own discretion" of major military
movements. The document also calls for future discussion of this issue.
Several other measures proposed by nonaligned or subordinate bloc members
were also effectively vetoed by one or both superpowers. For example, a Rumanian
proposal calling for further concrete negotiations on disarmament and withdrawal of
all foreign troops53 was reduced to a vague statement about the "necessity to take
effective measures in these fields (disarmament and detente) which by their scope
and by their nature constitute steps towards the ultimate achievement of general and
complete disarmament under effective international control . . . ." In recent years
both superpowers have been increasingly reluctant to view plans for general and
complete disarmament (GCD) as being either desirable or feasible in the near future.
Rather they have favored a slow, piecemeal approach to disarmament. In spite of
the reference to GCD in the text, the principle of the step-by-step approach favored
by the two superpowers is clearly endorsed as opposed to the more immediate and
sweeping proposals favored by Rumania. Similarly a Swedish proposal calling for
the publication by all participating states of their detailed defense budgets54 was
rejected largely due to the opposition of the USSR. Finally, a Yugoslav proposal for
the gradual ' 'elimination of foreign military forces stationed on the territory of the
countries of Europe or on the Mediterranean"55 met with strong opposition as well
from the two superpowers.
This survey of decision making on several of the most widely contested issues
appearing before the committees drafting the section on security in the CSCE
indicates that a far greater degree of asymmetry was apparent in these negotiations
than appeared in the analysis of the authorship of the final text. This is because the
asymmetry in bargaining was not only reflected in what was put in the document but
also in what was left out. Proposals made by the most active nonaligned states,
especially Yugoslavia, Sweden, and Switzerland, were often either set aside or
drastically watered down due to the objections of one or both of the superpowers.
Even within the blocs there were indications that the proposals of the smaller nations
were effectively vetoed by their larger allies on several occasions. This was evi-
denced by Soviet opposition to Rumanian proposals on the non-use of force for the
settlement of disputes and in American opposition to the British proposals for a
compulsory notification of major military movements.
In at least several respects, the two superpowers were both in an advantageous
position in the CSCE. First, they were obviously the strongest actors in terms of both
53CSCE Document II/C/8, 28 September 1973.
MCSCE Document II/C/9, 23 October 1973.
MCSCE Document II/C/3, 24 September 1973.
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economic and military resources and thus also the most capable of issuing credible
threats and/or promises. Second, they also had the greatest threat potential since
they would suffer fewer losses than most of the other nations from the failure to
agree. Of course, both would have been hurt somewhat by nonagreement since this
would have represented a break in the momentum of detente. But in terms of the
content of the agreement itself, both also had something to lose since the major
thrust of the CSCE was to reduce the bloc structure of political-military-economic
interactions on the European continent. Along the same line the conference sought
to establish the independence and sovereign equality of all nations. Thus insofar as
the principles of the agreement were given any concrete content (which in fact they
often were not), this might provide a greater limitation on the ability of the two
superpowers to dominate their respective alliances and to intervene actively in
European affairs. Furthermore, since any agreement without either or both of the
superpowers would have been greatly weakened, any threat by either to opt for no
agreement would have been viewed seriously by the other participants. Thus, since
nonagreement would not have been terribly costly to the United States or to the
Soviet Union and since no agreement or an agreement without the participation of
the superpowers would have cost most of the other participants substantially in
terms of their goals of enhancing their status and freedom of action in European
affairs, the two bloc leaders, also endowed with predominant economic and military
power, obtained substantial leverage over the outcome of the CSCE negotiations. In
the case of the USSR this leverage was reflected both in a substantial contribution to
the authorship of the final document (over 16 percent of the attributable text) and in
a power of veto or postponement over many other proposals advanced by both
nonaligned nations and by a rebellious ally, Rumania. For the United States the
leverage was reflected more in bargaining within the NATO alliance to influence its
general stance and in a power to veto or postpone some issues favored by
nonaligned nations and by weaker allies.
Thus, the analysis of the authorship of the final text did not consistently show
very substantial asymmetry. However, it did indicate that, with several important
exceptions, nations with the least to lose from nonagreement in fact exerted greater
influence on the text than those with more to lose. It also indicated that there was
some relationship between military resources and influence over the portions of the
text dealing with "confidence building measures."
However, the most significant sources of asymmetry appeared, not in influence
over what was included in the final act of the CSCE, but over what was excluded
from it. This power of veto was exercised most strongly by the two superpowers in
the negotiations, the United States and the Soviet Union, indicating a strong degree
of asymmetry based on "threat potential," on structural position within the interna-
tional system, and on resources to back up influence attempts. Furthermore, some
states which were actively involved in the negotiations and which proposed a large
portion of the text, especially Yugoslavia, France, and Rumania, were not as
influential overall as might be suggested by measures of their contribution to the
final agreement. Their strong interest in an agreement led them to make a significant
number of proposals. Since some of these were adopted, they were among the
ht
tp
s:
//
do
i.o
rg
/1
0.
10
17
/S
00
20
81
83
00
00
38
91
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fr
om
 h
tt
ps
:/
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e.
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f B
as
el
 L
ib
ra
ry
, o
n 
11
 Ju
l 2
01
7 
at
 0
7:
30
:3
9,
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 th
e 
C
am
br
id
ge
 C
or
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 u
se
, a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
ps
:/
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e/
te
rm
s.
Asymmetrical bargaining in the CSCE 177
leading nations in terms of authorship of the text of the final act. However, a large
number of their significant proposals were vetoed by the two superpowers. They
were thus not as influential overall as might appear since many of their most
important proposals did not appear in the final act. Therefore, the analysis of
"non-decision-making" in the CSCE strongly supports the hypothesis about the
effects of both differences in resources and in utilities assigned to nonagreement as
important factors contributing to asymmetrical outcomes in negotiations.
The severe problems with operationalizing some of the most important var-
iables suggested in the theoretical conceptualization limited significantly the con-
clusions that can be drawn from this study. However, the propositions presented in
this paper were drawn from a general conceptualization of bargaining under condi-
tions of structural asymmetry, based in part on formal game theory and a strategic-
manipulative model of the bargaining process. The propositions are logically consis-
tent with some fundamental assumptions of these bodies of theory. Furthermore, the
propositions were generally found to be consistent with the negotiations which
occurred in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe with some
exceptions. Of course, reality is always more complex than any simple model, and
the results of this study indicate some important considerations that the model
overlooks. Nevertheless, the negotiations on CSCE did demonstrate certain signifi-
cant asymmetries in outcomes. These asymmetries seemed to reflect to a substantial
degree both the relative "threat potential" and the relative resources of the nations
participating in these negotiations, suggesting that these orientations need to be
brought together in any adequate theory of bargaining under conditions of structural
asymmetry.
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